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IMPLICATIONS OF THE PLANT PATENT ACT FOR THE
PATENTABILITY OF MICROORGANISMS
INTRODUCTION
Patent law provides a constitutionally sanctioned' incentive system aimed
at encouraging disclosure of new and useful inventions to the public.' The
patentee exchanges full and complete disclosure of how to make and use the
claimed invention for the court-protected right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the claimed invention for the statutory period of seventeen
years.' The patent scheme recognizes the investment of time and money by the
patentee and protects him from easy and inexpensive duplication of his
invention by others, the fear of which would encourage the patentee's keeping
his invention a secret.4 Thus, the effect of the patent system is to assure an open
marketplace for technological ideas.
One area of considerable commercial importance, microbiology, has been
denied much of the developmental stimulus inherent in the patent system
because of judicial reluctance to afford patent protection for a living product, the
microorganism itself.5 Recently, however, the United States Court of Customs
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides that Congress shall have the power "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to .. .
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .Discoveries."
2. Although the patent grant is commonly viewed as a contract between an inventor
and the federal government, it is promotion of the public's interest in disclosure, and not
protection of the patentee's rights, which serves as the motivating farce behind the patent
system:
The philosophy behind the patent law is very simple. It just says, "Let's encourage
disclosure." That is its purpose, its lifeblood, its raison d'etre ...
The patent system was the first "freedom of information act" and the first
"sunshine law." The system is not based on an award to the inventor. The hope for a
profit is the carrot, but any award to the inventor is left entirely to the public. A
patent on the unwanted is worthless.
Presentation by Chief Judge Markey, The Federal Judicial Center Workshops for District
Judges, reprinted in 80 F.R.D. 203, 205 (1979).
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 154 (1976) deal with disclosure requirements and the content
and term of the patent grant, respectively.
4.
[11n America, if an inventor wants to profit from his invention, he has two
alternatives. He can try to keep it a trade secret or he can disclose it. . . . If, after
years of money, effort, time, blood, sweat, and tears, the inventor discloses his
invention, and if there be no adequate patent system, then anyone can simply copy it,
and because they have no such investment to recoup they can immediately sell it
cheaper. Without protection the inventor will decide "I better keep it a trade secret."
Markey, C.J., supra note 2, at 205.
5. See generally Edelbute, Microbiological Applications and Patents, in THE ENCYC-
LOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT 567 (R. Calvert ed. 1964); Irons
& Sears, Patents in Relation to Microbiology, 29 ANN. REV. OF MICROBIOLOGY 319 (1975);
Wegner, Patenting Nature's Secrets - Microorganisms, 7 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 235 (1976).
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and Patent Appeals issued In re Bergy (Bergy II),' a landmark decision in which
the court held man-altered microorganisms to be patentable subject matter
within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101.7
Bergy II consolidated the cases of two prospective patentees. In the first case,
Bergy claimed a patent in a biologically pure culture of the microorganism
Streptomyces vellosus, asserting that it was either a manufacture or composition
of matter within the meaning of section 101.8 Bergy had discovered the mi-
croorganism in the course of inventing a new process for producing the
antibiotic lincomycin. The new process, utilizing the Streptomyces vellosus in
controlled laboratory conditions, resulted in a more efficient recovery of
lincomycin than was previously possible.' The second case involved a patent
application for a Pseudomonas bacteria that the claimant Chakrabarty genetic-
ally modified by high frequency transmission of plasmids into the bacterial cell.
Thus altered, the microorganisms were able to degrade crude oil and its residue
and, hence, would be useful in controlling oil spills." The single issue considered
in Bergy II was whether a man-modified microorganism is excluded from the
categories of patentable subject matter listed in section 101 solely because it is
alive.'1
The correctness of the court's ruling can only be determined through an
examination of the intent of Congress in enacting the patent legislation.
6. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted sub nor. Parker v. Bergy, 100 S.Ct. 261
(1979), vacated with respect to Parker v. Bergy, 100 S. Ct. 696 (1980). Bergy H combined
the appeals of two different claimants, Bergy and Chakrabarty. See notes 20 & 21 and
accompanying text infra. Arguments on Diamond v. Chakrabarty were heard by the
Supreme Court on March 17, 1980. 48 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-136).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new or useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."
8. 596 F.2d at 967-68.
9. Bergy's patent claims for the lincomycin-producing process using the microorgan-
ism had been allowed by the patent examiner; his claim for the microorganism itself was
rejected. Id.
10. Id. at 968-70. Chakrabarty also developed a process for controlling oil spills
utlizing the Pseudomonas bacteria he had altered. His patent claim with respect to that
process, as well as the process for developing the microorganism, was allowed. Id. at
970-71.
11. The narrow, technical issue before the court was whether the particular
definitions of their inventions used by Bergy and Chakrabarty in their claims for patents
pursuant to § 112 would be allowed. Id. at 955. Both Bergy and Chakrabarty had
inventions determined to be patentable: the patent claims to the processes utilizing the
respective microorganisms were allowed; only the claims for the microorganisms
themselves were disallowed. See notes 9 & 10 supra. Section 112 requires that the
applicant "particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which [he]
regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). The question whether Bergy's and
Chakrabarty's claims were allowable involved, according to the court, what meanings
were to be given "manufacture" and "composition of matter" within the context of § 101,
596 F.2d at 955-56, because the applicant must define his invention in his patent claims in
such a way as to fall within cognizable subject matter of § 101. In the court's view,
therefore, the question was whether certain of Bergy's and Chakrabarty's patent claims to
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Unfortunately, the legislative history of the general patent statute, which is in
pertinent content essentially the same as the statute passed in 1790 by the First
Congress, offers no useful guidance with respect to patent grants for living
products; 2 however, subsequent patent legislation may provide such guidance.
The 1930 Plant Patent Act 3 is central to the controversy because it specifically
concerns living material. The 1930 Act entitles one who discovers or invents and
asexually reproduces a new and distinct variety of plant to obtain a patent,
excluding others from asexually reproducing the plant and from selling or using
any plant so reproduced." Since In re Arzberger'2 it has been clear that the Act
does not extend patent protection to microorganisms, despite their scientific
classification as plants and their ability to reproduce asexually. 6 The signifi-
cance of the Act in the context of Bergy II therefore lies in its implications with
respect to the general patent provision.
This Note will examine the Plant Patent Act and its import for the question
of "aliveness" raised in Bergy II. Although plant patent legislation, which has
existed for fifty years without serious constitutional challenge, establishes that
the quality of "aliveness" is not a constitutional bar to patentability, the
argument can be made that if the quality of "aliveness" necessitated specialized
legislation in the case of plants, it is a bar to patentability under the general
patent authorization provision. 7 It is therefore essential to understand the
their respective finds - the claims to the microorganisms themselves - were cognizable
as manufactures or compositions of matter within the meaning of § 101.
The court distinguished this narrow issue from the broader question whether
Bergy and Chakrabarty had made patentable inventions in their microorganisms. That
Bergy and Chakrabarty had patentable inventions had already been determined. The
court thus saw its role as interpreting § 101 and not creating or "extending" patent law. Id.
at 955.
The reason the issue whether a man-modified microorganism is excluded from the
categories of patentable subject matter is couched in negative terms of exclusion lies in the
nature of the subject matter. Patent law regulates the products of innovation, and
innovation connotes the unforeseen. The question, therefore, cannot be whether Congress
foresaw the specific technological advances involved in Bergy II and intended that they be
included in § 101 but whether Congress intended to deny patent rights under § 101 solely
on the basis of "aliveness." See id. at 973-76. It is important to note that no prior case had
held that § 101 either explicitly or implicitly precludes granting a patent simply because
the subject matter is alive. See id. at 971.
12. See generally Federico, The First Patent Act, 14 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 237 (1932).
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976).
14. Tuber-propagated plants (e.g., potatoes) are specifically excluded from plant
patent protection. Id. § 161. Undoubtedly, this exception is based on the impossibility of
enforcing patent protection for the asexual reproduction of a plant, where the reproductive
part of the plant is sold for food.
15. 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
16. In In re Arzberger, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that Congress
"in the use of the word 'plant,' was speaking 'in the common language of the people,' and
did not use the word in its strict scientific sense." Id. at 838. This decision has been
variously criticized, and many commentators have maintained that reconsideration and
reversal of the ruling are in order. See, e.g., Daus, Bond, & Rose, Microbiological Plant
Patents, 10 IDEA 87 (1966); Irons & Sears, supra note 5, at 329-31.
17. See, e.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 999-1002 (1979) (Miller, J., dissenting).
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purposes motivating passage of the Plant Patent Act in order to determine
whether living organisms per se are barred from the statutory subject matter of
section 101. This Note suggests that passage of the 1930 Act was necessary only
because plant breeding requires innovation different in kind and degree from
that needed to obtain a patent under section 101. Moreover, the principal reason
why several commentators have interpreted the 1930 Act as a response to the
"aliveness" of plants, rather than to their unique status as inventions, is the
difficulty of describing living organisms in detail, 8 a difficulty that is
acknowledged in the statute itself.'9 Description problems simply indicate that
"aliveness" is one characteristic of the invention. The quality of life does not
constitute the essence of an invention, either in the case of plants or in the case
of the Bergy 11 microorganisms.
Bergy 11
In Bergy 11 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reaffirmed its earlier
rulings in favor of microorganism patentability in In re Bergy (Bergy 1)20 and In
re Chakrabarty.2' After the initial decisions in those cases, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari with respect to Bergy I but did not confront the issue
presented. Instead, it summarily vacated the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
Parker v. Flook.22 In light of the Court's action in Bergy I, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, at the government's request, vacated its ruling in
Chakrabarty, choosing to rehear and decide the two cases as though formally
consolidated.23
Upon reconsideration of the two earlier cases, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals found the Supreme Court's decision in Flook wholly inapplicable
to product claims for man-modified microorganisms.2" Flook had held a claimed
process to be nonpatentable subject matter where its only arguably novel feature
18. See, e.g., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1362 (1978); 47 UMKC L. REV. 130, 138-39
(1978). But see Guttag, The Patentability of Microorganisms: Statutory Subject Matter and
Other Living Things, 13 U. RiCH. L. REV. 247, 262-63 (1979); Note, The Patentability of
Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In re Bergy, 58 NEB. L. REV. 303, 325-26 (1978).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1976) states that a plant patent cannot be declared invalid if its
description "is as complete as is reasonably possible."
20. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Parker v. Bergy,
438 U.S. 902 (1978).
21. 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A.), cert. dismissed sub nom. Banner v. Chakrabarty, 439 U.S.
801 (1978), vacated, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
The court had reversed the Patent Office's denial of Bergy's claim, In re Bergy,
563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), and later, relying on the Bergy decision, also reversed its
denial of Chakrabarty's similar claim, In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
22. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
23. 596 F.2d at 957.
24. Id. at 967.
1979]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
was an unpatentable mathematical formula. 25 The court concluded that the only
relevant link between Flook and the Bergy I and Chakrabarty cases was the
issue of statutory interpretation of section 101 subject matter. Inasmuch,
however, as Flook involved interpretation of the word "process" within the
meaning of section 101, it was not useful in deciding what was a composition of
matter or manufacture, the question posed in Bergy 11.26 Quoting the Flook
holding that an "improved method of calculation . . . is unpatentable subject
matter,"27 the court stated that since the cases before it did not involve methods
of calculation, Flook, strictly speaking, had no bearing.' It went on, however, to
consider the implications of the Flook opinion for the meaning of section 101.
The court said that neither Bergy's nor Chakrabarty's microorganism could
be excluded from the categories of statutory subject matter as being within the
traditional principles or laws of nature exclusions. ' It also pointed out that the
microorganisms could not be excluded on the basis of being within the prior art
in the way the Supreme Court related that concept to the scope of statutory
subject matter in Flook.3 Both the patent examiner and the Board of Appeals of
the Patent and Trademark Office in each case had expressly found that no
question of the prior art had been raised."
25. The process was a method of calculation for certain alarm limits in the process of
catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons. Its essential feature was a new formula for
computing the values of the alarm limits. See 437 U.S. at 587. The Supreme Court
declined to consider the novelty of the formula itself; rather, it treated the formula as a
mathematical expression of a well-known scientific principle. Id. at 588-89. Laws of
nature, natural phenomena, abstract intellectual concepts, and scientific truths had never
been considered patentable because they could not be said to be the invention of the patent
seeker. Id. at 589. See also I A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 14 (2d ed. 1964).
Consequently, the Court held: "Respondent's process is unpatentable under § 101, not
because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that
algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole,
contains no patentable invention." 437 U.S. at 594. Whether the scientific principle at
issue in Flook was, in fact, well-known was irrelevant; it had always existed in nature, and
its discovery could not support a patent, there being no other new and useful aspect to its
application. Id.
26. 596 F.2d at 964-65. Both Bergy's and Chakrabarty's process claims had been
allowed. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
27. 596 F.2d at 965 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 965-66. See note 25 supra. The court enumerated those things that are
deemed to be nonstatutory subject matter: "Principles, laws of nature, mental processes,
intellectual concepts, ideas, natural phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods of
calculation, fundamental truths, original causes, motives, [and] the Pythagorean theorem
..... " 596 F.2d at 965. For a criticism of the court's treatment of the natural phenomenon
issue, see Note, Bergy, Flook, and Microorganisms as Patentable Products, 29
CATH. U. L. REV. 485, 499-502 (1980).
30. 596 F.2d at 965-66. See also note 25 supra.
31. 596 F.2d at 966. Judge Rich, writing for the majority, expressed concern over the
Supreme Court's evident confusion in Flook in the application of § 101, which requires only
that a claimed invention be useful and that it fall within one of the listed subject matter
categories, and §§ 102 and 103, which set forth the criteria of novelty and nonobviousness
respectively. Id. at 965-66. The novelty and nonobviousness criteria are not applied until
380 [VOL. 39
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Finally, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals specifically rejected the
applicability of dictum from Flook that suggested that the judiciary "proceed
cautiously when. . . asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen
by Congress. '32 The court noted that Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Latram Corp.,3
the case cited by the Supreme Court in Flook in support of this contention, was
inapplicable in the context of Bergy H. Deepsouth dealt with a request to make a
change in the law by expansion or overruling prior interpretations of a statute.
By contrast, what was contemplated in Bergy H, a case of first impression, was a
straightforward interpretation of section 101.11
Before considering the merits of Bergy's and Chakrabarty's appeals, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals noted the basis of the Board of Appeals'
conclusion that the microorganisms were not patentable subject matter because
they are alive. Although the Board acknowledged that section 101 did not
expressly exclude living matter from the covered subject matter," it argued that
if Congress had intended to include living matter in section 101, it would not
have found it necessary in 1930 to enact special patent legislation for plants,
the claimed invention satisfies one of the subject matter categories of § 101. Id. at 960-64.
An invention must be novel in that it evidences a change from that which went before, i.e.,
the prior art. P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, ch. 6, § 1 (1975). Nonobviousness
refers to the character of this change: if the difference between the claimed invention and
the prior art is such that the invention as a whole would have been obvious at the time it
was made to any person skilled in the art, then the invention fails for obviousness. Id. ch.
8, § 2. See note 66 infra.
The court emphasized that prior art is irrelevant with respect to the preliminary
determination of subject matter patentability under § 101. Only after an invention has
been shown to be encompassed within one of the statutory categories does prior art become
a consideration. 596 F.2d at 962-63. In Flook, however, the Supreme Court had arguably
relied upon the concept of prior art in rejecting the applicant's process claim under § 101.
The Court equated the abstract scientific principle embodied in Flook's mathematical
formula with the prior art and held that the process depending on the formula was not
within the categories of patentable subject matter. 437 U.S. at 594. As a result, the
decision leaves unclear whether the claimed process is unpatentable because the formula
on which it depends, like a law of nature, is non-statutory subject matter per se or because
the formula is obvious given its origin, i.e., an abstract principle that has always existed in
nature. In any event, neither objection properly arises in the context of determining what
is a process within the meaning of § 101.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals summarized the distinction: "It is one
thing to say that a principle, natural cause, or formula, per se, is not within the categories
of § 101, but quite another to say it is prior art in determining the nonobviousness of an
invention predicated on it even though the inventor discovered it." 596 F.2d at 966. It
foresaw that the Supreme Court's equation of laws of nature and the prior art might
undermine the established rule that patentability can be predicated on discovery of a
problem's cause, even though, once that cause is known, the solution is effected by obvious
means. Discovered causes are oftentimes classed as laws of nature or their effects: if such
causes are considered part of the prior art, their discovery in conjunction with an obvious
solution would not support a finding of patentability. Id.
32. 437 U.S. at 594.
33. 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
34. 596 F.2d at 966-67.
35. Id. at 971.
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which are living matter3 If living matter fell within section 101, the Plant
Patent Act was superfluous. The Board reasoned, therefore, that the Congres-
sional intent in enacting the general patent legislation was to exclude living
matter from the statutory categories.
Holding that microorganisms were patentable subject matter under section
101, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals noted that a new technology need
not have been foreseen by Congress at the time of enactment of section 101 for it
to fall within the section. Indeed, such a restriction would negative the purpose
to provide an incentive to invent, especially in light of modern technological
advances." The court found that the claims involving Bergy's and Chakrabarty's
modified microorganisms could fall within the language of section 101, which
had historically been interpreted broadly.' What the patent legislation tradi-
tionally had encouraged was the development of new industries. The court noted
the burgeoning industry involving microorganisms, analogous to industries
utilizing and creating non-living chemicals, which had always been considered
patentable subject matter." The difference between inanimate chemicals and
living organisms used for their chemical reactions was not legally significant."0
Moreover, since processes utilizing microorganisms had always been within
section 101, the court found it "illogical" that the microorganisms themselves
should be excluded as patentable subject matter."
In the earlier Chakrabarty and Bergy I opinions, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals had found that the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act of
1930 had no relationship to, and, therefore, no bearing on, the cases dealing with
microorganisms.42 In Bergy II, the court reasserted this position. However,
because the Board of Appeals' position in Bergy II was based solely on the
negative implication drawn from the Plant Patent Act that life forms were never
intended to be included in the general patent legislation, the court believed it
was necessary to consider the history and purposes of the Act. 3 It first denied
that the Act could reflect the legislative intent of the earlier Congress that had
enacted the original patent statute." The court enumerated three reasons for
passage of separate plant patent legislation: to afford agriculture the same
incentives enjoyed by industry,4 to avoid the judiciary's "product of nature"
prejudice,4" and to mitigate the description problems encountered in living
36. Id.
37. Id. at 973-74.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 974-75.
40. Id. at 975.
41. Id. at 977.
42. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031,
1038-39 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
43. 596 F.2d at 978.
44. Id. at 978-79.
45. Id. at 982.
46. Id. at 982-83. Much has been written about the judicially-created "product of
nature" objection. E.g., Jacob, Patentability of Natural Products, 52 J. PAT OFF. Soc'v 473
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inventions." It concluded that the purposes of enactment of plant patent
legislation created no inferences about the patentability of living organisms as a
class - in 1930, Congress was thinking about plants, and plants alone.48
Finally, in response to the Board of Appeals' contention that allowing these
claims would be an unwarranted extension of the patent law, the majority noted
that over the years numerous patents had issued for manufactures, compositions
of matter, and processes that incorporated living organisms and their life
functions" and questioned the logic of disallowing patentability simply because
the man-modified product was the organism itself. The court concluded that
(1970); Kip, The Patentability of Natural Phenomena, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 371 (1952); 47
Micm. L. REV. 391 (1949); 33 MINN. L. REv. 430 (1949).
The relevant case law indicates that the objection is not a distinct doctrine applied
consistently by the courts. See, e.g., American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex, 283 U.S. 1
(1930) (decay-resistant, borax-treated oranges held unpatentable); In re Marden, 47 F.2d
957 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (ductile uranium held unpatentable); General Electric Co. v. DeForest
Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1928) (purified ductile tungsten
held unpatentable). But see Merck & Co., Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d
156 (4th Cir. 1958) (vitamin B12 recovered from life processes of microorganisms held
patentable); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd, 196
F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (purified adrenalin extracted from the suprarenal glands of living
animals held patentable). The "product of nature" cases diverge along two lines that one
commentator has labeled the restrictive and the expansive views. Kip, supra, at 377-83.
While the restrictive school emphasizes the previous inherent being of a natural
product or a process, regardless of its practical availability, the expansive school
stresses the newly accessible effects of the discovery to demonstrate that the claimed
subject matter in itself is not identical with what was known or used or practically
available before, and hence does not encroach upon a public right. In so doing, as far
as tests of statutory novelty are concerned, the expansive school classifies contrivances
composed of natural elements in the same category as artificial patentable subject
matter.
Id. at 380-81. Another commentator has ably criticized the restrictive approach for its
practical effects:
There was evidence in these cases of a large amount of effort, research, and originality
expended by inventors in man-making them. Therefore, if a definition of the term
"product of nature" were adopted from these decisions, it would be so broad that the
"product of nature" rule would seriously if not completely curtail patentability of
products of any sort.
. Other cases indicate, however, that the true definition of "product of nature" is
much narrower. It appears from these decisions that, as generally defined, a product of
nature is one occurring on the earth in a form that has not been changed by any act of
a human being.
47 MicHi. L. REV. 391, supra, at 395 (footnotes omitted). Given the uncertain climate
created by these cases, it is understandable why Congress might be concerned about
judicial disfavor of patent protection for new varieties of plants.
47. 596 F.2d at 984.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 985-86. Perhaps the most famous of such patents was issued to Louis
Pasteur in 1873 for a purified form of yeast. One commentator views Pasteur's patent as
evidence that Bergy's claimed invention "involves not so much new technology as an
unobvious advance in a very old technology." Kiley, Common Sense and the Uncommon
Bacterium - Is "Life" Patentable?, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 468, 470 (1978).
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allowing microorganism product patents to issue was not the unsupportable
extension of patent rights proscribed by the dictum in Flook.0
Judge Baldwin concurred in the result reached by the majority, but
disagreed with the conclusion that Flook had no applicability to the issues
presented in Bergy H.111 Examining the cases cited by the Supreme Court-in
Flook, Judge Baldwin found that "[tihe common thread throughout these cases
is that claims which directly or indirectly preempt natural laws or phenomena
are proscribed, whereas claims which merely utilize natural phenomena via
explicitly recited manufactures, compositions of matter or processes to accom-
plish new and useful end results define statutory inventions." 2 He concluded
that Bergy's and Chakrabarty's claimed microorganisms, though not found in
nature in the state claimed in the patent applications, performed functions that
are phenomena of nature. However, neither Bergy nor Chakrabarty attempted
by his claim to preempt performance of these functions., The lack of natural
phenomena preemption in Bergy's and Chakrabarty's claimed inventions, in
addition to the constitutional patentability of living things as demonstrated by
the Plant Patent Act, convinced Judge Baldwin that man-modified microorgan-
isms are patentable subject matter within the scope of section 101.1
Judge Miller, the sole dissenter, believed that the majority had missed the
main point of Flook. He understood the point to be that, inasmuch as Congress
could not have foreseen much of new technology, the courts should move slowly
in extending the law in particular areas when there is "substantial doubt" as to
the intent of Congress in an area.' The issue presented in Bergy II raised such a
substantial doubt. He cited the passage of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which
extended patent protection to certain asexually reproduced plants, as a strong
indicator of Congressional intent in the original patent provision. He reasoned
that passage of the specialized statute would have been superfluous had living
organisms been patentable under the 1790 Act, and rules of statutory
construction support a presumption that Congress does not legislate unnecessar-
ily.' Judge Miller thus emphasized the issue that is central to this Note: What
characteristic of the plant breeder's work spurred Congress to enact special
patent protection apart from that already afforded under the general patent
provision?
50. 596 F.2d at 984-86.
51. Id. at 988. Judge Baldwin's concurrence may be most interesting for his conversion
from his previous position in Bergy I, 563 F.2d at 1039-42 (Miller, J., Baldwin, J.,
dissenting), and In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 44-45 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
52. 596 F.2d at 988.
53. Id. at 996-97.
54. Id. at 998-99.
55. Id. at 999.
56. Id. at 999-1002.
[VOL. 39
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THE 1930 PLANT PATENT ACT
1. Purposes Motivating Passage of the Act
The Plant Patent Act was the first legislation anywhere in the world to take
cognizance of the value of the plant breeder's work and, hence, the need to
extend the incentives of the patent system to this area.57 One commentator of the
time expressed the hopes of the legislation's supporters:
It will be extremely interesting to follow the new developments in plant
breeding in order to determine the influence of the new patent protection on
agriculture. In years to come, much of the food consumed, many of the
clothes worn and even the houses occupied by man may be radically
changed by the mass attack of plant breeders so that the future generations
may speak of a horticultural revolution rivaling, if not surpassing the great
industrial revolution.a
The express purpose of the Act was to afford agriculture the same economic
incentives for experimentation and invention that industry enjoyed.59
Despite the express desire to extend the same economic benefits of the
patent scheme to inventors of both plants and manufactures, Congress'
treatment of agriculture and industry indicates a perceived distinction in the
nature of the processes involved in the development of new plant varieties and
the invention of a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."
The distinction becomes clearer in light of a statement made by Judge Baldwin
in his dissent to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' initial decision in
Chakrabarty:
The law, as propounded by the Supreme Court, defines three alterna-
tives. Between true "products of nature" and statutory subject matter of
"manufactures" lies an intermediate category of things sufficiently modified
so as not to be products of nature, but not sufficiently modified so as to be
statutory "manufactures."'
57. 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 430, 430 (1962).
58. Rossman, Plant Patents, 13 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 7, 21 (1931).
59. H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930); S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1930). Unfortunately, the Act did not produce the intended effect. Eighteen years
after passage of this legislation, one commentator noted that, of the few plant patents
which had been issued, most had been for new varieties of flowers and fruit- and
nut-bearing plants resulting in a "surprising dearth of patents granted for potentially
valuable utilitarian or agricultural purposes." Magnuson, A Short Discussion on Various
Aspects of Plant Patents, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 493, 511 (1948). See also Dienner, Patents
for Biological Specimens and Products, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 286, 289-93 (1953). Although
the Plant Patent Act has not spurred dramatic innovation in the field of agriculture, it
may yet contribute heavily to progress in science and the useful arts because of its
implication in the controversy surrounding microorganism patentability.
60. 571 F.2d at 45.
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The Plant Patent Act protects inventions or discoveries that fall within this
intermediate category." Nonetheless,
[i]nvention as applied to plant patents comprises the same two inventive
acts which are required in other patents: conception and reduction to
practice. Conception is the recognition that a new variety exists, and
reduction to practice consists of asexual reproduction of the new variety.62
In the plant patent context, these two inventive acts, although they may be
preceded by years of patience and skillful breeding, are so intertwined with the
natural processes of growth and reproduction as to fall somewhere in the
intermediate area of the continuum propounded by Judge Baldwin.
2. Plant Patent Legislation and Case Law
The constitutionality of the specialized plant patent legislation was
questioned at the time of its proposal before Congress in 1930. The Constitution
authorizes Congress to grant exclusive rights to only two classes of persons -
authors and inventors. Whether the plant originator qualified as a "constitution-
al inventor" was addressed by the Senate Committee on Patents in its report on
the proposed bill. The Committee asserted that "there is no apparent difference
. . . between the part played by the plant originator in the development of new
plants and the part played by the chemist in the development of new
compositions of matter." Like the former, the chemist who invents relies upon
the natural properties of his materials. The Committee added the following
statement:
But even were the plant developer's contributions in aid of nature less
creative in character than those of the chemist in aiding nature to develop a
composition of matter which has theretofore been non-existent (an assump-
tion which the committee does not believe to have basis in fact and which is
here made solely for the purposes of argument), nevertheless the protection
61. The legislation focuses upon protection of new varieties of plants. A variety is the
basic category of plant classification. In fact, every plant may be considered a variety in
that it possesses its own individual characteristics, whether as a result of chromosomal
changes, cultivation methods, environmental factors, or any combination of the three. 11
CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 430, 430 (1962). Much of the time, these individual variations are too
insignificant to perpetuate; however, when a plant manifests unique characteristics of
distinctive usefulness or beauty, the plant breeder can preserve the variety by asexual
reproduction.
New and distinct varieties may be cultivated from sports, mutants, hybrids, and
new found seedlings. For an explanation of the first three plant types, see Rossman, supra
note 58, at 13. New found seedlings, asexually reproduced by the patentee, became
patentable subject matter under the 1954 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 161. For a discussion
of this amendment, see text accompanying notes 83 to 90 infra.
62. 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 430, 436 (1962) (footnote omitted). See also Dunn v. Ragin,
50 U.S.P.Q. 472, 475 (1941).
63. S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1930).
[VOL. 39
PLANT PATENT ACT
by patents of those engaged in plant research and discovery would not be
beyond the constitutional power of the Congress."
This statement suggests that the statutory standards of invention for "any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"' - the
ordinary patent subjects - are more rigorous than is the constitutional
standard."
64. Id. at 8. See also 596 F.2d at 1001 (Miller, J., dissenting). Judge Miller interpreted
the Committee's remark as its recognition of a dichotomy existing between animate and
inanimate inventions. For him, the quality of animateness, or life, predominated over any
distinction which could be made between plants and other patentable subject matter.
65. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692 (1897) (amending 60 R.S. § 4886
(1878), current version at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)). In 1930, the list of patentable subject
matter under the general statute did not include "process" as does the current statute,
although "process" is probably synonymous with "art" as used in the older statute. See I.
A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 25, § 15.
66. Among commentators, whether there is in fact a constitutional standard of
invention is a hotly debated issue. See, e.g., Irons & Sears, The Constitutional Standard of
Invention - The Touchstone of Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653 (1973). But see, e.g.,
Markey, Special Problems in Patent Cases, 57 PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 675 (1975); Rich, The
Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 8 IDEA 136
(1964); Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 393 (1960). As discussed in
the text above, Congress purportedly determined that plants are patentable subject
matter. However, the question still existed, and to some extent still exists, whether
particular subject matter must meet a constitutional standard of invention to be patented
or whether satisfaction of the statutory requirements satisfies the Constitution. The
controversy today centers on the nonobviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103, which
first appeared in the 1952 revision of the general patent statute. See note 31 supra.
Congress added the requirement in an attempt to clarify a confusing array of past cases
which had demanded that a claimed process or product possess the elusive quality of
"invention." See H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952). The confusion had
culminated in Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941), in which
the Supreme Court held a claimed patent invalid for failure to display "the flash of
creative genius," as opposed to the mere "skill of the calling." Id. at 91. Prior to the 1952
amendment, subject matter and the criteria to patentability were combined in a single
section of the statute. Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, § 1, 46 Stat. 376 (1930), providing in
pertinent part, "any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art ... not
known or used by others,. . . and not patented or described in any printed publication...
and not in public use .. .may . . .obtain a patent therefor." (emphasis added). Courts
had read this section to require utility, novelty and "invention."
The nonobviousness requirement codified a test for invention that had developed
in the cases; i.e., whether "the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole should have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). Cf Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851) ("[Flor unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the
old method . . . were required in the application of it [to the new use] than were possessed
by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that
degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention.").
Inasmuch as Congress in the 1952 amendment intended to eliminate the confusing aspects
of the judicial concept of invention and codify what was the essence of the requirement of
invention, it has been argued that satisfaction of the requirements of the patent statute
19791
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Congress' determination that the products of plant breeders could meet a
threshold standard of invention and thus that plant breeders are within the
constitutional class of inventors led it to amend the general patent statute to
include new varieties of plants which had been asexually reproduced as an
additional category of patentable subject matter. In enacting the Plant Patent
Act, however, Congress failed to acknowledge that although the products in the
new category shared the constitutional minimal inventiveness of the other
categories, there is an important distinction between the utility patent
categories and the new category for asexually reproduced plants. In contrast to
the entirely man-made utility patent product, natural processes are necessarily
involved in the plant innovators' "invention." 7 Rather than alleviating the
courts' product of nature prejudice," including asexually reproduced plants in
the categories of patentable subject matter, as Judge Rich discussed in the
majority opinion in Bergy 11,19 seemed instead to perpetuate the prejudice by
failing to make the distinction.
This statutory union was criticized:
There are such fundamental differences between plant breeding and
mechanical invention that the attempt to form a biologio-legal hybrid
between them seems fraught with needless difficulties. Genus hybrids are
notoriously sterile, and indications are that this union of life and law is no
exception. Just as design patents are dealt with under a separate statute, so
should plant patents be considered to be distinct, having only a slight
connection with mechanical and chemical patents. 0
These remarks came in the wake of the first court test of the plant patent
legislation, Cole Nursery Co. v. Youdath Perennial Gardens, Inc." In Cole
Nursery, the court invalidated a patent issued for the upright barberry plant,
which had been developed by a process of selection and genetics through five
generations of seedling planting and growth. Dictum in the opinion reflects the
will satisfy the Constitution. E.g., Rich, supra. Cf. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959-62
(1979) (setting out the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 as a scheme for
patentability to which concept of invention in its former, legal sense has no application).
The Supreme Court, in cases since the 1952 amendment, has agreed that the criteria for
patentability are utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. See, e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,
425 U.S. 273 (1976); Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57
(1969); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). However, the Court has referred to a
threshold constitutional standard of invention, indicating that the statutory requirements
might allow a patent in a case the Constitution would not. See id. at 6, where the Court
said, "[innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge
are inherent requisites in a patent system which by Constitutional command must
'promote the Progress of. . .useful arts.'"
67. See text accompanying notes 60 & 61 supra.
68. See note 46 supra.
69. 596 F.2d at 982-83.
70. Cook, The First Plant Patent Decision, 19 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 187, 190-91 (1937).
71. 17 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ohio 1936), appeal dismissed, 101 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1939).
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conceptual difficulty created by merging the new legislation with the inventor's
traditional subject matter:
The use of nature and knowledge of propagation of plant life seem to me
to have been the forces behind the development of the upright variety of
barberry. I am not prepared to accord invention to the result produced by
such uses in respect of the upright barberry; but if it were otherwise, the
fact of the knowledge and existence of the plant prior to the amendment of
May, 1930, and its prior public use, would fatally impair its validity.7 2
One commentator expressed concern over the court's belief that the active
process of selective breeding did not constitute invention. If breeding techniques
could not produce a valid patent, then patents obtained for sports and mutants,
sporadic abnormalities over which the breeder has no control, would be invalid
also.73
A subsequent case, Ex parte Foster,7 proved these exact fears unfounded. In
Foster, the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office made a
distinction between persons who have engaged in "plant cultivation or care" and
plant explorers who have accidentally happened upon what they recognize to be
a new variety in nature.75 In Foster, the applicant, a professional in plant
cultivation, propagation, and hybridization, while on a business trip to South
America, discovered in a downtown garden in a Colombian city two syngonium
plants that differed from the other syngoniums in the garden. He returned to
Florida with the two plants, decided that they were a new variety, and asexually
reproduced them.76 The Board of Appeals held that the words "invented or
discovered" and "new" have the same meaning whether applied to plants or
other classes of patentable subject matter. Because the plants found by the
applicant had previously existed in nature, they did not satisfy the terms of the
statute.77 As a basis for its holding, the Board specifically noted that all classes
of patentable subject matter are listed in the same sentence of the statute, with
no language to signal differential treatment of any particular class."
72. Id. at 160.
73. Cook, supra note 70, at 190.
74. 90 U.S.P.Q. 16 (1951).
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 17.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Board also found support for its decision in the legislative history of the
Plant Patent Act. Id. at 17-18. In its report on the proposed bill, the Senate Committee on
Patents had disapproved the proposal to grant patents on mere finds:
[Ilt is to be noted that the committee has, by its amendment in striking out the
patenting of "newly found" varieties of plants, eliminated from the scope of the bill
those wild varieties discovered by the plant explorer or other person who has in no
way engaged either in plant cultivation or care and who has in no other way
facilitated nature in the creation of a new and desireable variety.
S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1930).
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The Plant Patent Act is now codified separately"9 from the general patent
provisions. The new section, 35 U.S.C. § 161, engrafts the Act onto the general
patent law, requiring that the provisions of Title 35 "relating to patents for
inventions shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided." 0 The
only express exception appears in section 162,1 which relaxes the description
requirements for plant patents,8" so that the claimed plant variety must satisfy
the criteria of novelty and nonobviousness demanded of all other inventions.'
The application of these criteria is secondary to a determination of subject
matter patentability, however. Although plant products must satisfy the general
standards of patentability, the statutory separation of plants from other
patentable subject matter facilitates the different conceptualization of invention
necessary when the invention is a plant.
A further example of the different conceptualizations of invention is found
in the 1954 amendment to the Plant Patent Act, which specifically excludes
plants "found in an uncultivated state" from patent protection." The legislative
history of the amendment indicates that its purpose was clarification of
Congress' intent that patent protection be afforded to one "who through no
particular efforts of his own other than perhaps by accident, develops a new
plant which is, nevertheless, due to his activity."85 In a memorandum reviewing
the proposed amendment, Commissioner of Patents Watson pointed out the
ambiguity in the statutory language: "It is possible that the references to
cultivation in the present bill might be urged as distinguishing from a pure
chance find. . . . [However,] it is not certain whether the new plant itself must
be the subject of cultivation, or must merely be found in a cultivated area.""
Commissioner Watson noted that under the terms of the statute, a prospective
patentee might simply recognize, i.e., discover, a new variety that he finds
growing in his neighbor's garden. This happenstance would be tantamount to a
chance find, and a statute authorizing patent grants for such discoveries would
be of dubious constitutionality.
Commissioner Watson's hypothetical case became an actual case in Ex parte
Moore." In Moore, the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office held
79. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976).
80. Id. § 161.
81. Id. § 162.
82. See text accompanying notes 94 to 104 infra.
83. Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1377 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
84. Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1259, 68 Stat. 1190 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976)).
85. S. REP. No. 1937, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3981, 3982. See also H.R. REP. No. 1455, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954).
86. S. REP. No. 1937, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3981, 3984; H.R. REP. No. 1455, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1954).
87. Id. See also Irons & Sears, supra note 5, at 328 n.31. Irons and Sears suggest that
the 1954 amendment, construed to provide protection for chance finds, is unconstitutional
in that it permits grants to issue on products of nature. For a discussion of the product of
nature objection, see note 46 supra.
88. 115 U.S.P.Q. 145 (1957).
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that one who recognizes a new variety growing in his neighbor's yard and
asexually reproduces it with his neighbor's permission has a valid claim for a
patent over the neighbor's claim because the neighbor did not recognize the new
variety and so could not have been the "discoverer."' 9 One commentator has
pointed out that the fact patterns in Moore and Foster are virtually indisting-
uishable: both cases seem to involve chance finds in cultivated areas, yet
Moore's plant patent was determined to be valid, while Foster's patent was
invalidated." Although Moore was adjudicated after the 1954 amendment, it is
difficult to understand how the variety claimed by Moore was brought into
existence "due to his activity" any more than was the plant claimed by Foster.9'
Despite the amendment's declared purpose of merely clarifying existing law, the
Board of Appeals' interpretation of the amendment has led to the creation of
new law. Nonetheless, Moore makes clear that a "plant invention" requires
innovation different in kind and degree from that needed to obtain a utility
patent. In other words, the innovation required of the plant patentee is to
"appreciate" that a plant variety is new.' Without recognition of such
appreciation, the plant breeder would not be motivated to reproduce the plant
and the variety would be lost. 3
3. Description Problems
The principal reason why several commentators have focused upon the
characteristic of life as the distinguishing feature of patentable plants,' rather
than upon the unique approach to their invention, is the difficulty of describing
a living organism in detail.
From a written and/or pictorial description of the usual utility or design
patent, one skilled in the relevant art can make and use the invention. This
is not true of living matter. A mere description is incapable of placing the
plant in the hands of the public. Consequently, the paper application is not
deemed an enabling disclosure. 5
Because of this distinction, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re
LeGrice" ruled that the publication of the descriptions of two new Rosa
89. Id. at 147.
90. 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 430, 435 (1962). This commentator does identify one point
of distinction between the two cases: in Foster, two plants of the new variety were
discovered by the patentee giving rise to the inference that the variety had already existed
in nature. The Board of Appeals in Foster did not rely upon this point in its opinion,
however. Id.
91. Id.
92. 115 U.S.P.Q. at 147. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
93. 115 U.S.P.Q. at 147.
94. 91 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1362 (1978); 47 UMKC L. REV. 130, 138-39 (1978).
Contra, Guttag, The Patentability of Microorganisms: Statutory Subject Matter and Other
Living Things, 13 U. RicH. L. REV. 247, 262-63 (1979); Note, The Patentability of Living
Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In re Bergy, 58 NEB. L. REV. 303, 325-26 (1978).
95. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 31, ch. 5, § 1.5 (footnote omitted).
96. 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
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floribunda varieties in an English catalog would not invalidate the applicant's
claim for their invention made one year later. A printed description of the plant
placed nothing in the hands of the public; therefore, a patent grant on each plant
would not deprive the public of anything that it had previously enjoyed." A
corollary to this rule is that a plant patentee cannot establish infringement
unless he can show that the accused's plant is the asexual progeny of his
patented variety. This means, as a practical matter, that the patentee must
prove that the alleged infringer had access to the patentee's stock.9 Plant
patents involve a singular biological entity. In fact, there cannot be a basic or
dominating patent that encompasses a later, narrower claim in the plant context
- a situation that frequently arises with mechanical patents.9
Specification difficulties for living organisms result from genetic instability
in the reproductive process. The principal reason for the provision in the Plant
Patent Act for only asexual reproduction of the newly-discovered variety is to
preserve the unique characteristics of the plant:
If an attempt is made to reproduce [the plant] by planting [its] seeds, many
of the desirable characteristics found in the parent will divide up among the
offspring with mathematical exactness as determined in Mendel's law of
heredity, and others produced by the chance union of complementary
mendelizing "factors," will not reappear in the progeny."
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals alluded to the problem of genetic
instability in LeGrice:
While man can and does assist nature by the cross-pollination of
selected parent plants, the actual creation of the new plant, because of the
almost infinite number of possible combinations between the genes and
chromosomes, is not presently subject to a controlled reproduction by act of
man. While those skilled in this art now understand the mechanics of plant
reproduction and the general principles of plant heredity, they are not
presently able to control the factors which govern the combinations of genes
and chromosomes required to produce a new plant having certain
predetermined desired properties. '
97. Id. at 944.
98. Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1958), affd, 276 F.2d 259 (9th
Cir. 1960); Armstrong Nurseries, Inc. v. Smith, 170 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Tex. 1958). See also
Langrock, Plant Patents - Biological Necessities in Infringement Suits, 41 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 787 (1959). Langrock asserts that the requirement of proving physical appropriation
creates an almost insurmountable burden for the plaintiff patentee. He suggests that the
law be changed to create a presumption of infringement upon a showing that the
defendant's allegedly infringing plants are "substantially the same" as the patented
variety and that the defendant had a "minimum opportunity" for appropriation. The
burden of proof would then shift to the defendant who, after all, is in the best position to
explain the origin of his plant. Id. at 789-90.
99. 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 430, 434 (1962).
100. Rossman, supra note 58, at 13.
101. 301 F.2d at 938.
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There are, however, considerations militating against the genetic instability
argument, especially in light of recent developments in the area."°2 The court in
LeGrice noted that the rapidly evolving fields of plant heredity and plant
eugenics might someday make it possible to file a written description of a new
plant that would constitute an enabling disclosure.' °0 The Plant Variety
Protection Act of 1970,11 which authorizes patent-like protection for new
varieties of seeds, illustrates that breeding techniques have advanced to the
stage where plant varieties now may be reproduced from seeds true to form.
Written description of living organisms based on their genetic makeup was not
unforeseen when the Plant Patent Act was passed;10 surely, now that plant
breeders can assure stable transmission of desirable characteristics from one
generation to the next, there is no reason to focus on genetic instability as the
primary distinction between living material and other patentable subject
matter.'
CONCLUSION
The basis for passage of the Plant Patent Act was the distinction perceived
by Congress between agriculture and industry. The majority opinion in Bergy II
did not address the root of this distinction when it was confronted with the
argument that the legislative purpose of the Act was to enable life forms to be
patented. Rather, the court merely echoed the legislative history of the Plant
102. Irons and Sears assert that the genetic instability argument is a "shibboleth."
Irons & Sears, supra note 5, at 325 n.20. Interestingly, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals recently invoked the genetic instability argument to affirm the Board of Appeals'
rejection of claims both for a process for breeding normal chickens from dwarf hens and
normal cocks and for the chicken brought into existence by this process. The Board did not
discuss whether either claim involved statutory subject matter, thereby leaving open the
issue of the patentability of living things under § 101. In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A.
1975).
103. 301 F.2d at 939.
104. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976). This statute, unlike the Plant Patent Act, is not
administered by the Patent Office, but rather by the Office of Plant Variety Protection, a
bureau within the Department of Agriculture. Grants of protection under this Act are
similar to plant patents; however, the grants are termed Certificates of Plant Variety
Protection. Specifically excluded from protection under this legislation are okra, celery,
peppers, tomatoes, carrots, and cucumbers.
Irons and Sears believe that the Act is prima facie unconstitutional because it
permits patent-like protection for seeds which, although novel, may not be either useful or
inventive. Irons & Sears, supra note 5, at 331 n.43.
105. Rossman, supra note 58, at 15.
106. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has held that an applicant for a patent
on an invention that involves the use of an unknown, generally unavailable microorgan-
ism may satisfy the disclosure requirements by depositing a culture in an established
repository. In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See also In re Glass, 492
F.2d 1228, 1232-34 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Hawkins, 486 F.2d 569, 574-75 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
The deposit must be permanent and irrevocable, guaranteeing free accessibility thereto by
the public once the patent actually issues. Irons & Sears, supra note 5, at 324. Certainly,
the deposit procedure would provide an equally accurate description for claims which cover
the microorganism per se.
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Patent Act and did not explain why special legislation should be necessary to
protect the early phases of one field of endeavor when the general patent
provision traditionally protects the embryonic stages of new technologies.107 The
foregoing discussion indicates that Congress perceived the need for the 1930 Act
because the plant breeder's approach to invention differs in kind and degree
from that of the industrial patentee. The plant breeder's work is more closely
bound to natural processes than is the work of the manufacture inventor. While
Congress made the determination that the plant breeder is within the
constitutional class of inventors, those plants that can be patented have to show
evidence of having been invented, of being more than naturally occurring.
Congress addressed itself to delineating the parameters of "invention" for plants
in enacting the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and subsequent amendments.
Moreover, Congress was concerned with certain description problems associated
with the patenting of plants.
The Plant Patent Act does not demonstrate that Congress intended to
exclude nonliving subject matter from the general patent statute and relegate it
to its own section of patent law. On the contrary, if plant inventions are no
longer set apart on the sole basis of their aliveness, microorganisms (and other
inventions which happen to be alive) are patentable under the general patent
statute. Additionally, the deposit system devised by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals for inventions using microorganisms mitigates many of the
objections to patenting a live manufacture or composition of matter based on
description problems.
107. According to Judge Rich, "Congress had in mind the stimulation of a field of
endeavor that, unlike chemistry, for example, had not as yet flowered into an industry."
596 F.2d at 982 (emphasis in original). The Plant Patent Act was designed to stimulate
"an art still in the research and experimental stage." Id.
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